Ethics and Politics in John Dewey

Abstract

This research examines the relationship between ethics and politics in the philosophy of John Dewey (1859–1952), proceeding from the premise that, for him, these two realms do not constitute separate fields; rather, they intertwine within a single philosophical project grounded in human and social experience. Ethics is not a set of fixed, transcendent commandments but a practical inquiry into the conditions of optimal action; likewise, politics derives its legitimacy not merely from the possession of power or the organization of institutions, but from its capacity to expand the possibilities of freedom, participation, communication, and growth. Consequently, for Dewey, democracy is an ethical value and a way of life—prior to being a constitutional form of government.

The study seeks to elucidate the pragmatic and instrumentalist foundations of Dewey’s moral philosophy and to analyze concepts such as experience, habit, value, the good, freedom, and responsibility, while also exploring his vision of society, the state, democracy, and the public interest. It further examines the role of education as a link between ethics and politics, critically discussing whether grounding values ​​in experience and consequences leads to moral relativism, and whether the criteria of growth, communication, and participation suffice to establish a robust philosophical defense of democracy.

Employing a historical, analytical, and critical methodology—supplemented by comparative analysis where appropriate—the research concludes that Dewey’s originality lies in shifting ethics from the realm of abstract principles to the arena of experience, and transforming democracy from a mere institutional system into a social culture. However, this project still requires greater precision regarding the criteria for values ​​that should not be entirely subjected to changing circumstances or the calculation of consequences. Thus, Dewey’s significance emerges as a philosopher of democratic ethics and culture, rather than as the architect of a detailed constitutional theory.